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INTRODUCTION

Across the globe, those who study bankruptcy
recognize that there are several fundamental failures of the
system. Each country utilizes a different and specialized
bankruptcy code, none of which have yet been perfected.
More specifically, the different codes for corporate
reorganization generally lead to conflicts between the
shareholders and the creditors of insolvent companies.
Disagreements between creditors and shareholders can lead
to a bevy of problems with plan proposals and acceptance of
cram-down. These conflicts are not easily repaired, but each
code attempts to lessen these struggles as best as possible.
The most notorious attempt at resolving this problem
is the United States’ use of the absolute priority rule.
Although the absolute priority rule does result in certain
complications, the United States has successfully used it to
make the corporate restructuring process run more smoothly.
On the other hand, other large economic powerhouses, like
Brazil, have not adopted statutes similar to the absolute
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priority rule. Over time, a comparative approach has revealed
that the use of the absolute priority rule leads to a shorter plan
proposal period1, but is that really beneficial for the debtor
company in the long term?
It seems that many differences in the way corporate
reorganizations are treated in the United States and in Brazil
hinges on the use, or lack of use, of the absolute priority rule.
The absolute priority rule, embedded in the United States
Chapter 11 code, was meant to be a standard of fairness.2
Without fulfilling the fair and equitable requirement, a plan
cannot be crammed down.3 Although the United States
implemented this rule as a requirement of treating each class
of creditors fairly, it leaves many questions of fairness
unanswered. This rule is said to be the proper method of
delineating rights for shareholders and creditors, but it does
not take into account all situations that landed a corporation
into bankruptcy.4
Brazil’s lack of an absolute priority rule does not mean
that the reorganization process is inherently unfair. Brazil
allows the corporation, along with its creditors and
shareholders, to decide what is fair for the parties involved
based on the different circumstances of each individual case.
Without a rule requiring each senior class to be paid in full
before a junior class can receive benefits allows more room for
negotiation. With more negotiation comes a longer period of

Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in
Corporate Reorganizations, 41 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 651–684
(1974), 653.
2 Id. at 651
3 Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 581-606 (2016), 595.
4 See Blum, supra note 1, at 652.
1
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time that the creditors and shareholders can squabble over
what each party is entitled to. This difference in fundamental
rules is one of the main reasons why corporate
reorganizations take much more time in Brazil than in the
United States.
II.

BACKGROUND ON BRAZIL

Brazil is the largest country in South America and in the
Southern Hemisphere, sharing a common border with every
single South American country with the exception of Chile
and Ecuador.5 In addition to its geographic vastness, Brazil is
also the eighth largest economy in the world, even after
experiencing the worst recession in the country’s history.6 The
world views Brazil as South America’s principal economic
powerhouse. Investors spend a great deal of money buying
shares of and lending to large up-and-coming Brazilian
corporations. Until recently, American investors considered
Brazilian companies to be lucrative investments.
After experiencing the worst recession in the country’s
history in 2015 and 2016 the market value for publicly traded
shares in Brazil dropped precipitously. The average value
went from $1.02 trillion in 2013 before the recession to $490.5
billion in 2016 after the recession.7 Brazil’s latest political
scandal and the impeachment of the country’s president8

5_CENT.

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BRAZIL,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/br.html (last updated Nov. 17, 2017).
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Matthew DiLallo, 3 Top Brazilian Stocks to Buy in 2017, THE MOTLEY FOOL,
LLC._(June_6,_2017,_2:14_PM),
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crushed the stock market even further and has led to crippling
effects, the likes of which shareholders of many large
Brazilian companies have felt throughout the country.9 With
all of the recent volatility within Brazil, the threat of
corporations entering into bankruptcy has become a real fear
for shareholders and creditors alike.10
New bankruptcy filings for 2017 were expected to
surpass the over 227 corporate bankruptcies requested in
2016.11 In 2016 a record number of companies, ranging from
oil equipment to manufacturing to construction firms,
requested court protection from creditors.12 There were about
1,863 companies requesting protection, which was around a
forty-five percent increase in requests from the previous
year.13 For Brazilian companies, the past three years have
been riddled with uncertainty, lack of funds, and the threat of
insolvency; which has ultimately lead to a large number of
bankruptcies and judicial reorganizations. This article
discusses, with a focus on the discrepancies between Brazilian
and U.S. laws, the ever-prevalent power struggle between
shareholders and creditors during the corporate

https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/06/06/3-top-brazilian-stocksto-buy-in-2017.aspx.
9 Patti Domm, These US Stocks have the most at risk from the emerging Brazil
crisis (May 18, 2017, 6:31 PM), CNBC: MARKET INSIDER,
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/18/these-u-s-stocks-have-the-most-atrisk-from-the-emerging-brazil-crisis.html.
10 Aluísio Alves, Bankruptcy filings for big Brazil firms seen hitting another
record, REUTERS (January 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbrazil-restructuring-bankruptcy/bankruptcy-filings-for-big-brazil-firmsseen-hitting-another-record-idUSKBN15E2NG.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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reorganization process that begins when companies file for
judicial bankruptcy protections in Brazil.
III.

GOALS OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY

Investors are aware that one of the biggest risks of the
lending market is the possibility of corporate insolvency and
bankruptcy. Some creditors view bankruptcy as beneficial to
their cause while others see it as harmful to their initial
investment. The only way to figure out whom the corporate
bankruptcy process benefits is to determine the main goals
behind filing. Certain safeguards are put in place to protect
both creditors and equity holders in a judicial bankruptcy, but
what is the central goal of corporations filing for and going
through the restructuring process?
Corporations file for bankruptcy when they can no
longer keep up with their ongoing short-term and long-term
obligations. They need help in order to carry on their regular
operations without sinking deeper into debt. The benefit of
corporate bankruptcy is conferred to both the secured and
unsecured creditors as well as the company’s equity holders.
But, who is supposed to benefit the most from corporate
reorganization: the company itself or its creditors?
In many instances, what the shareholders want to gain
from corporate bankruptcy is much different than what the
creditors desire from the process. The shareholders want to
retain their equity interests and hold onto shares until the
company turns things around, even if it comes at the expense
of creditors.14 The creditors, on the other hand, want to seize

14 Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 582

(1998).
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the company’s assets and sell them off as soon as possible in
order to repay their debts.15 Both parties have their own
interests in mind when it comes to the insolvent company.
The creditors are not concerned if their benefit comes at the
detriment of the shareholders and vice versa. In theory,
bankruptcy courts are designed to take a balanced approach
to corporate reorganization. The court is expected to weigh
the options and determine what is best for all parties involved
while allowing a seamless reorganization.
The reorganization process provides businesses with
a second chance to continue on with their endeavors.
Bankruptcy allows insolvent corporations to have a fresh start
once the business has paid off all of the agreed upon
obligations. Traditional experts (“traditionalists”) in the field
of bankruptcy believe that reorganization is vital to preserve
not just the companies themselves, but also the jobs
opportunities that these companies provide to the local
communities.16 Alternatively, there are procedural experts
(“proceduralists”) who believe that the preservation of
companies is not an independent good in itself that comes
from the bankruptcy.17 Does corporate reorganization serve
mainly to pay off the creditors and cut losses or to save the
corporation from going under?
If corporate reorganization laws serve to protect the
company, then an environment where laws give the
shareholders more negotiating power in the process is
beneficial to the overarching bankruptcy goals. When a
corporation enters into bankruptcy the shareholders have the

Id. at 581.
Id. at 579.
17 Id. at 579-80.
15
16
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business’ viability in mind, they would prefer to see
continued growth instead of liquidation. In order to maintain
the shareholders’ equity stake and capital investment, the
company must be successfully reorganized; otherwise
shareholders stand to lose their entire investments. This
means that the shareholders will attempt to dispose of certain
creditors through use of the reorganization plan. Ridding the
company of these obligations will facilitate an environment
where the balance sheet ultimately shows assets that are
larger than liabilities once the fresh start begins. This may
come at the expense of the creditors, which, if the main goal
of reorganization is to the save the company and allow it to
continue on, would be considered an act for the greater good.
On the other hand, if the main goal is to maximize the
value of the estate and adequately pay creditors, then giving
shareholders more power is not necessarily in the best interest
of the process. In order to increase value for creditors, there
needs to be at least some dilution of equity and an increase in
the value of the estate. The general unsecured creditors would
require more power in the process as well as the ability to
create a unified creditor’s committee. It is in the best interest
of the general unsecured creditors to increase the value of the
corporation’s estate in order to preserve a larger payout and
receive higher percentages of their claims after the secured
creditors liens are satisfied.
The secured creditors believe that selling off the
company’s assets is more beneficial to them than allowing the
company to continue on its business operations. When a
company reorganizes using secured collateral, the collateral
tends to depreciate and lose most of its value. The secured
creditors need the opportunity to ask for adequate protection
and even propose their own plans to the court in order to
preserve some of the collateral’s value. The interests of
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shareholders and secured creditors in either process are
almost directly averse to each other. It is important to figure
out the primary policy behind the Brazilian bankruptcy laws
in order to determine whether the shareholders or the
creditors should have more say in the process.
The point of reorganization is to allow an insolvent
company to continue its operations when the going concern
value is viewed as more favorable than liquidation value.
Generally, the going concern value is beneficial to most
parties involved, unless the corporation ultimately fails. In
liquidation, shareholders lose their equity as the company is
dissolved and its assets are sold off.18 Usually, a majority of
the company’s assets are secured by liens, some of which may
have decreased in value over the life of the loan.19 Once assets
are sold off, very little value is left for the general unsecured
creditors to recover.20 In liquidation proceedings, general
unsecured creditors’ claims are paid pennies on the dollar, if
they even see a return at all.21 Usually, all or most of a
company’s collateral is encumbered by multiple liens and the
remaining value in the estate is minimal. In liquidation sales,
collateral sells for the foreclosure value, which is much less

Understanding Bankruptcy: The Differences Between Reorganization and
Liquidation,_MAXWELL_DUNN_PLC_(July_10,_2015),
http://maxwelldunnlaw.com/blog/understanding-bankruptcy-thedifferences-between-reorganization-and-liquidation/.
19David C. Smith & Mark Jenkins, Creditor Conflict and the Efficiency of
Corporate_Reorganization,_7_(2014),_http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdo
c/download?doi=10.1.1.445.3920&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
20 Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business Bankruptcy: The Need
for Different Rules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 88 (2014).
21
Harley Hahn, Liquidation or Reorganization? SANTA BARBARA
INDEPENDENT_(2013),_https://www.independent.com/news/2013/may
/05/liquidation-or-reorganization/.
18
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than market value. This leaves almost every creditor’s claim,
secured and unsecured, unsatisfied. Conversely, companies
who reorganize have a higher probability of satisfying their
debts and making creditors more whole than liquidated
companies.22
In the United States, the main goal of corporate
bankruptcy is to maximize the estate.23 The debtor in
possession is required to maximize the amount of value
contained within the estate in order to pay back creditors over
the course of the plan.24 Shareholders of bankrupt companies
in the United States barely have a voice in the bankruptcy and
are the last to recover-after all other classes of creditors have
been paid. The absolute priority rule set out in section
1129(b)(2) of the code prevents any junior class from receiving
payment if a senior class has not been paid in full.25 As the
most junior class in a chapter 11 bankruptcies, shareholders
are at a huge disadvantage. In U.S. chapter 11 cases the
creditors have more power because the goal is not to save the
company, but to pay back the creditors. Corporations in
chapter 11 are almost completely governed by the bankruptcy
court, which protects the interests of the creditors and only
promotes rehabilitation of the debtor corporation only where
it is deemed feasible.26

See Understanding Bankruptcy, supra note 18.
David K. Spiro, Robert S. Westermann, & Sheila DeLa Cruz, Summary of
Chapter
11
Procedures
and
Process,
4,
http://www.hflaw.com/images/uploads/VBA_Summary_of_Chapter_11_Procedures_
and_Process.pdf.
24 Id.
25 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2017).
26 See Spiro, supra note 23, at 5.
22
23
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The main goal of Brazilian bankruptcy after the 2005
amendments was allegedly to increase the creditor rights in
an attempt to mirror the United States code for chapter 11.27
This has not created an environment as creditor-friendly as in
the United States, because shareholders still have much more
of a say in Brazilian corporate bankruptcies. The lack of an
absolute priority rule is one of the main factors that
differentiate the plan proposal process between both
countries. Additionally, under the current judicial
reorganization laws, Brazilian corporations have the ability to
pay dividends upstream even before repaying their
restructured debts once they pass through the reorganization
process.28 Often, money to shareholders is paid out before the
already restructured secured bank debts are even marginally
repaid.29
The Brazilian corporation also enjoys the exclusive
ability to propose a plan throughout the entirety of the case,
while in the United States the exclusive period is only the first
120 days after filing.30 Additionally, there are no strictly
adhered to avoidance powers in Brazilian corporate
bankruptcy. This means that there is less capital coming into
the estate to be paid to general unsecured creditors and
certain creditors may be treated with a preference over

John J. Rapisardi & Joseph Zujkowski, Navigating Judicial Reorganization
Under the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law, 256 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 2016, at 1.
28 Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Brazilian Bankruptcy Law Changes May Boost Lending
Growth_(April_4,_2017,_8:25_AM),_REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/fitch-brazilian-bankruptcy-lawchanges-m/fitch-brazilian-bankruptcy-law-changes-may-boost-lendinggrowth-idUSFit994113.
29 Id.
30 See Rapisardi, supra note 27, at 2.
27

2018

THE POWER STRUGGLE

349

others.31 In the United States, the trustee’s avoidance powers
allow for preferences and fraudulent transfers within a
certain period of time before filing to be returned to the estate.
Courts and trustees in Brazilian judicial reorganizations do
not apply the measures that are utilized by courts in the
United States that are meant to maximize the bankruptcy
estate.
The difference in priorities between the two countries
has an immense effect on the way they treat corporate
reorganizations. Although Brazilian bankruptcy laws have
attempted to be more creditor-friendly, the shareholders still
have a much larger say than in the United States. Majority
shareholders have a lot of influence when it comes to the
board of directors’ decision on accepting any newly proposed
plan. The influence that shareholders have in the Brazilian
bankruptcy process coupled with the multiple rejections of
the creditors’ newly proposed plans leads to a more drawn
out process and less favorable terms for the creditors.
IV.

BACKGROUND ON BRAZILIAN BANKRUPTCY LAWS

On February 9, 2005 Brazil enacted the new Brazilian
Bankruptcy and Restructuring Law (“BBL”), also known as
Federal Law No. 11.101.32 This law sought to revitalize the
corporate bankruptcy process and did away with the

Id.
Restructuring & Insolvency (Nov. 2017), GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH,
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/35/jurisdiction/6/restructuri
ng-insolvency-2017-brazil/.

31
32
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outdated bankruptcy laws that had been in use since 1945.33
The new BBL was modeled after the United States Chapter 11
code, moving the country’s corporate bankruptcy laws away
from liquidation with a push towards restructuring and
reorganization.34 The new rehabilitation procedures allowed
for either (a) an in-court judicial reorganization, (b) a prepackaged reorganization handled outside the courtroom, or
(c) liquidation.35
During the in-court judicial reorganization, the debtor
is protected against the enforcement of actions throughout a
certain period of time, similar to the automatic stay in U.S.
chapter 11.36 The stay period for judicial reorganization in
Brazil is a statutorily mandated 180 days, which is triggered
once the court accepts the petition for reorganization.37
During this stay period, the debtor negotiates and prepares
its plan for reorganization that the creditors must approve.38
If the debtor does not file a plan within 60 days of acceptance
of the case, the bankruptcy is automatically converted to
liquidation instead of remaining a reorganization.39
Once the plan is agreed upon and confirmed, prepetition claims are discharged and the company can continue

Giuliano Colombo & Thiago Braga Junquiera, Ten Years of the Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law: Some Lessons Learned and Some Wishes for Improvement, 1
CLEARY GOTTLIEB EMERGING MKTS. RESTRUCTURING J., (Spring 2016), at 11.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 2017 Insolvency and Corporate Reorganization Report: Brazil (April 25,
2017), INTL. FIN. L. REV., http://www.iflr.com/Article/3712317/2017Insolvency-and-Corporate-Reorganisation-Report-Brazil.html.
38 See Colombo, supra note 33.
39John J. Rapisardi & Joseph Zujkowski, Bankruptcy Basics Under Brazilian
Law, 252 N.Y.L.J., (July 3, 2014), at 2.
33
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on with its operations.40 The only way for a company to enter
into judicial reorganization is by its own volition, creditors
cannot force judicial bankruptcy upon a corporate
institution.41 Additionally, once a debtor files for judicial
reorganization it maintains plan exclusivity throughout the
entirety of the case.42 As a result, the only leverage that
creditors have in plan negotiation is threatening to vote
against the plan or objecting to its approval.43 This gives the
debtor company, along with the controlling shareholders
within that company, much more leverage than the creditors
during the judicial bankruptcy process.
Once in judicial reorganization, the court appoints a
trustee to work with the debtor’s directors and officer or
whoever remains in charge of the business.44 All of the
debtor’s operating activities, the meeting with creditors, the
books and records, and performance of administrative duties
are supervised by the appointed trustee.45 As long as the
debtor meets all of its deadlines and the plan is accepted, the
company can move forward with the repayment of debts and
a fresh start. This is a huge change from the overturned 1945
Brazilian bankruptcy laws, where most companies were
liquidated instead of given the chance to preserve their going
concern value and reorganize.

See Colombo, supra note 33.
Paulo Fernando Campana Filho, The Legal Framework For Cross-Border
Insolvency in Brazil, 32 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 97, 115 (2010).
42See Rapsardi, supra note 39 at 2.
43 Id.
44Jeffrey M. Anapolsky & Jessica F. Woods, Pitfalls in Brazilian Bankruptcy
Law for International Bond Investors, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 397, 403 (2013).
45 Id.
40
41
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The extrajudicial reorganization is intended to be an
expedited process where the debtor obtains a quick
confirmation of the prepackaged proposed plan.46 The court
does oversee parts of this process, but the courts do not have
to intervene much because the plan has already been
negotiated and accepted by the majority shareholders and
creditors.47 Both the judicial and extrajudicial restructuring
options are used when the debtor company still has a certain
amount of going concern value and can feasibly continue on
its business operations after reorganization. If the business is
deemed non-viable, then bankruptcy liquidation of the debtor
will occur.48
In order for the judicial reorganization process to move
forward, a certain number of creditors must approve the plan.
The creditor class system used in judicial reorganizations
differs slightly from those in the United States.49Just like in the
United States, if a creditor class does not accept the terms of
the plan there is an option for cram down.50 In order the
successfully cram down the plan, each of the creditor classes
must be satisfied through the following: (a) creditors holding
more than fifty percent of the credit value must approve,
regardless of their creditor class; (b) at least two creditor

See Colombo, supra note 33.
Id.
48 Id. at 12.
49Angela Paes De B. Di Franco & Renato Din Oikawa, 2016 Insolvency and
Corporate Reorganization Report: Brazil (May 9, 2016), MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/brazil/x/489486/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/2
016+Insolvency+And+Corporate+Reorganisation+Report+Brazil.
(Stating the different class structures and priorities in Brazilian corporate
reorganizations.)
50 See 2017 Insolvency and Corporate Reorganization Report, supra note 37.
46
47
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classes must approve the plan by more than fifty percent in
both number and value; (c) the class of creditors to be
crammed down must approve by at least one third in both
number and value; and (d) there is a prohibition of unfair
discrimination in the class that rejects the plan.51 After those
requirements are fulfilled, the plan can be crammed down on
the rejecting class and the case can move forward. Because
there is no absolute priority rule in Brazil, cram down is much
easier. A lack of absolute priority rule to regulate “fairness”
means that there is no requirement for higher classes to be
fully satisfied before any lower classes are paid out. In theory,
even if the abovementioned class numbers approve the plan,
the shareholders could legally receive payment before any
secured or unsecured creditors.
The United States provides for the requirement that a
plan be “fair and equitable” in section 1129 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which triggers the absolute priority rule. In Brazil, there
is no such statutory provision, which means creditor rejection
of the plan does not invoke an absolute priority rule.52
Without an absolute priority rule, Brazil has no stipulations
about the order of payments in bankruptcy. In the United
States the absolute priority rule provides that no “holder of
any claim or interest that is junior to the claim or interest of
such [unpaid] class will not receive or retain under the plan
on account of such junior interest in property.”53
In order for a debtor in possession in the United States
to cram down a plan, it has to virtually exhaust the estate in
order to pay the senior classes. The leftover value in the estate,

51See

Di Franco, supra note 49.
Id.
53 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2017).
52

354

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 25

if there is any at all, leaves little to nothing for shareholders.
Because Brazils lacks this absolute priority rule, the creditors
have no say in the order of class payment. Even though
creditors take the time to secure and perfect liens on property
in order to have priority, secured creditors in Brazil are not
required to be paid to the same extent that they would in the
United States. Unsecured creditors and even shareholders
have the ability to receive their claims before the secured
creditor class is fully satisfied, or even satisfied at all.
Transparency is a fundamental part of the institution
of Brazil’s new bankruptcy laws. The debtor company’s
honesty throughout the process allows for the creation of
value and a mutual understanding of each party’s underlying
intentions.54 When an insolvent company communicates
clearly about its liabilities, assets, operations, and goals,
judicial reorganization becomes a much quicker process.
Before the enactment of the BBL, there were huge inequities
between creditor classes, where most secured and unsecured
debt took a back seat to tax liabilities and the payment of
employees.55 In theory, the BBL assists unsecured creditors
and equity holders in retaining more value than the previous
law allowed. Because labor and employment claims have a
maximum payout threshold, the secured creditors and
unsecured creditors receive a higher percentage of their
claims. As a result, the shareholders retain a maximized
amount of equity in the firm.

54Luis

Fernando Valente de Paiva, Understanding the Intricacies of Brazilian
Bankruptcy Law, 2011 WL 586859 1, 6.
55 Id. at 2.
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL

Although the BBL was modeled after the United States
Bankruptcy code, there are many differences between the two
laws. When Brazil enacted their new laws in 2005, the United
States also modified their bankruptcy code that same year.
Differences between the codes have led to very different
outcomes for both creditors and shareholders, as well as in
the length of time the process takes.
The first difference arises from the voluntariness of
filing for bankruptcy. Under the new BBL, a debtor
corporation has the exclusive right to file for judicial
reorganization.56 Adversely, in the United States, chapter 11
bankruptcy cases can be involuntarily commenced through a
filing of the debtor’s creditors.57 This means that in Brazil,
creditors are left without the ability to file a reorganization
remedy and only have the ability to file for a liquidation of
the debtor company.58 Liquidations are less useful in the case
of corporate bankruptcy, as the going concern value of
keeping the company alive is larger than the pennies on the
dollar received through a liquidation process.
The second difference between the codes concerns plan
exclusivity. In the United States, the debtor has the exclusive
privilege of filing a chapter 11 plan within 120 days after the
commencement of the case.59 This time of exclusivity can be
extended, but only up to 18 months after the commencement
of the case.60 In a Brazilian judicial reorganization, the debtor

See 2017 Insolvency Report, supra note 37.
Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
56
57
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enjoys the exclusive right to file a plan throughout the entirety
of the case.61 The creditors of the Brazilian company may
propose alternative plans of their own, but these plans cannot
be filed without the consent of the debtor. This exclusivity
comes with the caveat that the debtor only enjoys an
automatic stay period of 180 days and that the debtor’s plan
must be proposed within an extremely short 60-day period
after commencement of the case.62 If a plan is not proposed
within the first 60 days, then the company’s bankruptcy is
automatically converted to a liquidation proceeding.63
Conversion to a liquidation proceeding will also occur if the
Brazilian corporation’s plan is rejected by more than fifty
percent of the creditors (by face value) present at any
creditor’s meeting.64
Within any United States corporate bankruptcy
preceding the role of the creditor’s committee is very
important. Brazil’s new BBL statutory scheme provides for
the formation of a creditor’s committee, but these creditor’s
committees are rarely formed.65 Creditor’s committees in the
United States generally only include representatives from the
unsecured creditors parties.66 Conversely, in Brazil the
creditor’s committee is made up of one labor creditor
representative, one secured creditor representative, and one
general unsecured creditor representative.67 The interests of
these three groups almost always differ, which makes it

Id. at 2.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
61
62
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difficult for them to work together in order to adequately
represent a common goal for the singular creditor’s
committee. Additionally, in the United Stated the expenses of
the creditor’s committee are paid by the debtor’s estate, but in
Brazil most creditor committee expenses are not
reimbursed.68 The Brazilian creditor’s committee also face
harsher rules and punishments regarding losses to the estate
caused by negligence or malice.69 For these reasons, ad hoc
groups are formed more commonly than creditor’s
committees in Brazilian corporate bankruptcies.
Voting rights are also different in Brazilian corporate
bankruptcies than they are in United States chapter 11 cases.
In the United States, individual bondholders have the right to
vote on the debtor’s proposed plan.70 In Brazil, unless
bondholders commence a claim for separation, an indentured
trustee is chosen to vote on the plan on behalf of all the
bondholders.71 In order to avoid this, a bondholder can
separate his claim through an elaborate and complex process.
The bondholder must file a proof of claim with the judicial
trustee within 15 days of the case being noticed to the public.72
Proofs of claim ownership cannot be submitted via digital
copy in Brazil, making it difficult for bondholders to obtain
originals in order the separate their claims.
Overall, even though the BBL was based off of the
United States chapter 11 code, the differences between them
make for large distinctions in the treatment of creditors. In
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Brazil, the lack of cohesive creditor committees makes it
difficult for all creditors to be satisfied by any one proposed
plan. The debtor’s large exclusivity period makes it almost
impossible for the creditors to vote on a plan that they believe
will be beneficial to their interests. The limit of three voting
classes lumps bondholder and creditors into less specific
unsecured creditor classes to their detriment. Secured
creditors have a tougher time gaining benefits from Brazilian
corporate bankruptcies without a rule regulating fairness, like
he absolute priority rule. In the United States, creditors are
treated more equitably with stricter rules on fairness to
creditor classes. The Brazilian code tried to replicate the
creditor friendliness found in the United States code, but still
has work to do if the goal is to make the process as creditor
friendly as it is in the United States.
VI.

A CASE STUDY OF OI SA

One of the most notable cases of Brazilian corporate
bankruptcy in 2016 was the filing of Oi SA (“Oi”), formerly
known as Telemar.73 Oi is the largest telecommunications
company in Brazil, with over 74.5 million customers.74 When
the company filed in June of 2016, it was Brazil’s largest ever

73_Oi_S.A.,_The_Company,_http://ri.oi.com.br/conteudo_en.asp?idioma

=1&conta=44&tipo=44088 (Last visited Dec 16, 2017).
Lima Consulting Group, Ensighten Case Study: Ensignten’s Agile
Marketing Platform delivers one-to-one Marketing and superior digital
experiences_to_Oi’s_customer_base,_ENSIGHTEN,
https://www.ensighten.com/sites/default/files/oi-ensighten-casestudy.pdf.
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corporate bankruptcy.75As a result of Brazil’s recession and
the ongoing political scandals, Oi ran out of time to
reorganize operations and restructure over $19.3 billion
dollars of debt, leading to Oi’s filing for protection with the
bankruptcy court.76 At the time of filing, Oi’s debt consisted
of funds that were only 25% from Brazilian currency and 75%
from currencies other than the Brazilian real.77 The creditors
whose capital was most at stake were the foreign investors.
Since filing for judicial reorganization, Oi hosted
several conversations with creditors about potential plan
proposals. Discussions with creditors and bondholders about
restructuring the debt ceased shortly after the shareholders
realized that an agreement with creditors would result in a
dramatic cut of their stake in the company.78 During
settlement talks, former Oi CEO Bayard Gontijo favored a
proposal that would give creditors a 95% stake in the
company and leave current shareholders with virtually
nothing.79 The struggle between the shareholders of large
corporations and their major creditors is a significant issue in
current Brazilian corporate bankruptcy cases. Who really has
the power when it comes to decision-making during the
restructuring process?

Guillermo Parra-Bernal & Ana Mano, Oi files for Brazil’s biggest ever
bankruptcy_protection,_REUTERS_(June_20,_2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oi-sa-restructuring/oi-files-forbrazils-biggest-ever-bankruptcy-protection-idUSKCN0Z703V.
76 Id.
77 This Company Just Filed For Brazil’s Biggest Ever Bankruptcy, FORTUNE
(2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/21/oi-brazil-biggest-bankruptcy/.
78 See Parra-Bernal, supra note 75.
79 Id.
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From June of 2016 until December 2017 Oi held several
discussions with its creditors and shareholders about their
reorganization process. The creditors several ad hoc
committees submitted a multitude of new plans, but the
company’s board rejected each creditor proposal for over a
year and a half.80 The Oi board of directors, in return,
submitted several of their own proposals, none of which the
creditors found to be suitable.81 Because Oi had plan
exclusivity throughout the entire proposal process, it was
difficult for creditors to negotiate with equity holders.
Both parties rejected each other’s plans because the
shareholders and creditors could not agree on a middle
ground. The shareholders wanted to keep as much of their
equity as possible so that their payout would not be severely
impaired or diluted. On November 3, 2017, Oi mistakenly
disseminated a notice to the market that the company
accepted the creditor’s newest plan, leading to a false hope of
a resolution after over a year of negotiations.82 A press release
later that week on November 6, 2017 confirmed that the
referenced plan was not accepted and that the board members
of Oi were still conflicted as to what would be best for the
shareholders.83 The press release accused the Oi board

November 6 Press Release, BUSINESS WIRE (Nov. 6, 2017),
http://mms.businesswire.com/media/20171106006301/en/622914/1/
November_6_Press_Release_with_Exhibit-_Compiled_FINAL.pdf?
81 Gram Slattery & Tatiana Bautzer, Exclusive: Shareholder in Brazil’s Oi leans
on distressed debt funds for support (Nov. 1, 2017, 12:20 PM), REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oi-sa-restructuringexclusive/exclusive-shareholder-in-brazils-oi-leans-on-distressed-debtfunds-for-support-idUSKBN1D158Z.
82 Oi S.A., Notice to The Market (Nov. 4, 2017).
83See November 6 Press Release, supra note 80.
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members of shirking their fiduciary duties and appointing
new board members instead of carefully considering the
plans they were given.84The press release also accuses the
“Shareholder Plan” as “being backed by the minority
shareholders [who were] exerting control in an attempt to
preserve their equity position, and attempt[ed] to do so by
enlisting what the Oi Creditor Groups understood to be only
a handful of insignificant [equity] holders...who [would be]
seeking exorbitant fees at the time the transaction [would]
inevitably fail.”85 This somewhat proved that the
shareholders were the ones with the power in this situation,
pulling strings from behind the scenes in order to maintain
their stake in Oi. As a result of this blatant shareholder
infiltration of Oi’s board of directors, the court effectively
removed the board from ongoing debt renegotiations.86 The
board continued attempts at retaining power throughout the
process, because without their say an unfavorable plan could
have been voted on an approved.
Those who really had the most to power in the
company’s voting process were the majority shareholders
and equity holders of Oi. The largest shareholder of Oi at the
time was Bratel S.A. R.L, which owned 22.24% of the
825,760,802 shares on the market.87 The second largest was
Societe Mondiale Fundo de Envestemento em Acoes, holding
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about 5.28% of the total shares.88 The third and fourth largest
shareholder were Goldman Sachs International and Bndes
Participacoes S.A. Bndespar, respectively, both holding just
under 5% of total shares.89 The other two majority
shareholders, Marathon Asset Management L.P. and Mare
Finance Investment Holdings designated Activi, both held
between 1.5% and 2% of the total number of shares.90 The
minority shareholders made up the remaining 41.45% of the
equity in the company.91 Oi’s shares were selling at about 4.69
reals per share in 2017, which equates to $1.45 per share in
U.S. currency.92 When doing the calculations, the largest
shareholder owned about $266,291,343 U.S. dollars’ worth of
shares in Oi. There was a lot of money at stake for these
majority shareholders. They realized that their shares would
most likely become diluted, but by how much?
Oi claimed that the proposed creditor plans treated its
stakeholders unfairly and the company’s own proposals
included a debt to for equity swap of 25%.93 The creditor’s
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92Oi_S.A.,_Share_Prices,_(Dec._18,_2017),
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93 Brazilian phone carrier Oi to amend terms to creditors: filing, REUTERS (Nov.
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plans also “provided for the discharge of third party claims
against the Company and its subsidiaries on customary
terms, provided that such discharge shall not waive or release
of any claims against shareholders, officers and directors of
the Company.”94 Although Oi rejected the plan, the creditors
still believed that it was in their best interest to continue with
negotiations instead of moving forward with a liquidation of
the company.95
Regardless of the removal of Oi’s board of directors
from the voting process, it was still difficult to approve a
creditor-friendly plan. Even though the board and its
shareholder influencers were removed from power, they did
joined together in an attempt to partner with public sector
creditors in order to pass Oi’s restructuring plan in the face of
the opposition by the bondholders.96 With a push from certain
shareholders, the board was offering deals to state banks in
exchange for votes.97 The deals included a repayment of the
banks claims at full nominal value, but over a longer period
of time.98 Oi’s deal contained provisions that allowed for the
company to have a six-year grace period before requiring it to
make payments to the banks, and then a ten-year period in
which to pay off the value of the loans.99 Oi’s board offered
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similar deals to investment banking units and international
credit agencies.100
The board required not only the support of the public
sector creditors, but approval by 20-25% of the bondholders
in order to pass Oi’s final plan.101 The major bondholders also
wanted to avoid liquidation at all costs because they had more
to gain from Oi’s reorganization than from the company’s
liquidation.102 Oi viewed some of their major bondholders as
hostile entities, and moved to remove the bondholder’s vote
during the process.103 Without a rule for fairness, the Oi plan
negotiations lasted over a year and a half. This is valuable
time that could have been spent repaying debts instead of
racking up more bills during the negotiations.
The real question here is: when will a plan be
satisfactory to all parties in a Brazilian bankruptcy? In a
bankruptcy proceeding this large, there is no way for all sides
to be completely happy, but they do need to come to an
agreement. In the end, the courts practically had to force a
plan onto the board in December 2017. After a 15 hour
meeting, three of the four creditor classes voted to approve a
plan on December 19, 2017.104 Because Brazil doesn’t have an
absolute priority rule, the plan was accepted even though one
of the largest creditors voted against it. As for creditors from
the United States, the bankruptcy court offered little to no
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relief. United States bankruptcy judges stated that the fight
over Oi’s future “must be fought in the Brazilian courts, not
in the U.S. courts.”105 In cases like these, the lack of absolute
priority rule was a large reason why the plan proposal period
took so long, but it was also the reason why a plan was
ultimately put into place. The parties had a longer amount of
time to negotiate and find a mutually-beneficial breakdown
of debt repayments.
VII.

THE FUTURE OF BRAZILIAN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY

Where is Brazilian corporate bankruptcy headed in the
future? Brazilian officials are discussing further amending the
2005 bankruptcy code.106 With the biggest recession in the
country’s history leading to a surplus of insolvent companies,
the proposed reforms are attempting to alleviate some of the
economic pressure on corporations and lift Brazil out of the
recession. Under the current code, it takes several years for an
insolvent corporation to approve a plan and then some
additional years to actually complete the plan.107 The process
is excruciatingly long and the Brazilian government wants to
make the time frame more compact.108 The changes would
allow indebted corporations to emerge from bankruptcy
more quickly and begin their fresh start even earlier.109 The
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average length of a judicial reorganization for Brazilian
corporations is around eight years and the proposed changes
would quarter the time it takes to get through the process.110
In addition to limiting the bankruptcy protection to only two
years, the proposed amendments would make it easier for the
debtor corporation to borrow funds and maintain
operations.111 The proposed changes also purport to help
creditors by granting them stronger powers in the plan
negotiations.112
According to Fitch Ratings, a change recently
proposed by the Temer administration has the ability to
improve the ability to obtain credit.113 The proposed changes
will provide additional comfort to banks, which will
ultimately support future lending growth.114 Brazilian banks
currently have around ten million real in repossessed assets
as collateral from unpaid loans.115 It is unclear if the proposed
new laws will allow banks to continue their practice of
repossession. Right now, the code gives banks the right of
fiduciary alienation.116 Fiduciary alienation allows the banks
to repossess collateralized property, even if the defaulting
corporation has filed for judicial reorganization.117 If banks
lose their right to fiduciary alienation and their right to collect
collateral, these loans will come at a higher cost to
corporations. Although the 2005 amendments were created to
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make the judicial reorganization process more creditorfriendly, the pending bankruptcy legislation puts more
emphasis on debtor’s rights.
Out of the 6,586 Brazilian corporations that applied for
judicial reorganization since 2005, only five percent have
recovered from the process.118 Brazil is in need of
amendments to their bankruptcy code in order the better help
the insolvent corporations that file for bankruptcy
protections. As of now, the very small percentage of
corporations that actually recover from judicial
reorganization in Brazil is a red flag that their system is not
working. In addition to the abovementioned reforms, the
Brazilian government has also been discussing changing the
way taxes are treated during judicial reorganization.119
Right now, there are no specified bankruptcy courts
that deal with corporate filings; all bankruptcies are handled
by the main court system in whatever district the company
headquarters is located. Discussions about creating
specialized courts would make a significant difference in how
bankruptcy cases are handled.120 Judges with superior
knowledge of the inner workings and technicalities behind
bankruptcies would expedite the process and create fairer
results for all parties involved. Fitch, a United States based
credit rating service, believes that these changes will have a
positive impact on the judicial reorganization process as a
whole.121 If the changes are announced and implemented
quickly, they may save hundreds, if not thousands of
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corporations and creditors from falling into the prolonged
and treacherous judicial reorganization system.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Even though the Brazilian government tried to adopt a
bankruptcy code similar to the United States chapter 11, it has
not made the process as creditor-friendly as in the U.S.
Brazil’s attempt at increased creditor rights turned the judicial
restructuring processes into one that is still majorly controlled
by shareholders rather than creditors. The Brazilian
government did adopt the measures used in United States
courts to maximize the estate and overall disbursements to
creditors, but the amendments need further modification if
the goal really is to increase creditor’s rights. The limited
exclusivity period, the absolute priority rule, the trustee’s
avoidance powers, the creditor’s committee for unsecured
creditors, the first priority of secured creditors, adequate
protection, and specialized bankruptcy courts are all tools
used by the United Stated to maximize the estate. Brazil, on
the other hand, does not use those but still expects to keep
creditor’s interests in mind. Ultimately, Brazil needs to
further amend their bankruptcy code and add more
safeguards to protect creditor’s rights and facilitate the
continuation of the corporation.
One option is to add a rule that regulates fairness,
similar to U.S. chapter 11’s absolute priority rule. In cases
where an entire company along with its creditors and
shareholders are at stakes, there should be some regulation of
debt payout. As shown through cases in the United States,
with the addition of an absolute priority rule comes a shorter
plan proposal period. This means that the debtor company
loses less money during the negotiation phase, which it can
then use to reorganize more efficiently and effectively. Brazil
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needs to define their main goals of corporate bankruptcy so
that better safeguards can be put in place to uphold those
goals. “Fairness” is very subjective, but as seen in the Oi case,
a lack of regulations regarding fair and equitable plan
proposals leads to longer negotiations, disgruntled parties,
and time spent on lofty goals instead of reaching more
grounded offers.

